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Cantor’s Paradise Regained:
Constructive Mathematics
from Brouwer to Kolmogorov to Gelfond
Vladik Kreinovich
Department of Computer Science
University of Texas at El Paso
El Paso, TX 79968 USA
vladik@utep.edu
Abstract. Constructive mathematics, mathematics in which the existence of an object means that that we can actually construct this object,
started as a heavily restricted version of mathematics, a version in which
many commonly used mathematical techniques (like the Law of Excluded
Middle) were forbidden to maintain constructivity. Eventually, it turned
out that not only constructive mathematics is not a weakened version of
the classical one – as it was originally perceived – but that, vice versa,
classical mathematics can be viewed as a particular (thus, weaker) case
of the constructive one. Crucial results in this direction were obtained by
M. Gelfond in the 1970s. In this paper, we mention the history of these
results, and show how these results aﬀected constructive mathematics,
how they led to new algorithms, and how they aﬀected the current activity in logic programming-related research.
Keywords: constructive mathematics; logic programming; algorithms

Science and engineering: a brief reminder. One of the main objectives of science
is to ﬁnd out how the world operates, to be able to predict what will happen
in the future. Science predicts the future positions of celestial bodies, the future
location of a spaceship, etc.
From the practical viewpoint, it is important not only to passively predict
what will happen, but also to decide what to do in order to achieve certain
goals. Roughly speaking, decisions of this type correspond not to science but to
engineering. For example, once we have come up with the design of a spaceship,
once we know how exactly it will be launched, Newton’s equations can predict
where exactly it will be at any future moment of time – and if our goal is to
reach the Moon, whether it will reach it or not. If we happen to stumble upon
the design and initial conditions that satisfy our goal, great, but in practice,
such situations are rare. Usually, we need to ﬁnd the initial conditions (and the
design) for which the spaceship will safely reach the Moon.
Similarly, once the bridge is designed, we can use the known equations of
mechanics to predict its stability and vulnerability to winds. However, a more
important problem is to design a bridge that will withstand the expected loads
under prevailing winds.
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Resulting need for constructive mathematics. The ultimate objective of a scientiﬁc analysis is to formulate an exact mathematical model of the corresponding
physical phenomena. Once the corresponding physical model is formulated in
precise mathematical terms, the practical (engineering) problem can be also formulated in mathematical terms: ﬁnd an object x (design, trajectory, etc.) that
satisﬁes the given precisely formulated condition P (x).
At ﬁrst glance, it may seem that similar statement exist in mathematics: for
example, mathematicians can prove statements of the type ∃x P (x). Intuitively,
to claim to prove that something exists often means to actually construct the
corresponding object, Indeed, for many centuries, most mathematical proofs of
the existence statements were based on the actual construction. Once in a while
there were proofs from contradiction, but they were rare. The situation changed
drastically at the end of the 19th century. The ﬁrst important result for which
an existence proof was provided without an explicit construction was David
Hilbert’s 1888 proof of the Finite Basis Theorem [10, 16–18]. This proof answered
an important question (raised by a mathematician Paul Gordan from Göttingen)
about the invariants of homogeneous polynomials. A polynomial P (x1 , . . . , xn )
is called homogeneous if all its monomials are of the same total degree d: e.g.,
n
∑
∑
we can have
ai · xi or
aij · xi · xj , with aij = aji . A polynomial function
i=1

i,j

f (aα ) of the coeﬃcients aα of this polynomial is called invariant it for every linear
def ∑
cij ·xj , this function changes by a
transformation of the unknowns xi → x′i =
′
multiplicative constant f (aα ) = λ({cij })·f (aα ). For example, for quadratic forms
of two variables a11 ·x21 +2a12 ·x1 ·x2 +a22 ·x22 , a discriminant D = a11 ·a22 −a212 is
an invariant. It was known that for the case of n ≤ 8 variables, for every degree
d, invariants have a ﬁnite basis in the sense that we can select ﬁnitely many
invariants so that every other invariant is a polynomial of the selected ones. For
example, for n = 2 and d = 2, every invariant is a power of the discriminant D.
Hilbert proved that such a ﬁnite basis exists for all n and all d, but – in contrast
to the previously known proofs for n ≤ 8 – his by-contradiction proof did not
provide any actual construction of the corresponding ﬁnite set. After reading
this proof, Paul Gordan himself said: “This is not mathematics; it is theology”;
see, e.g., [33].
Hilbert himself provided later a constructive proof of this result [19, 20], but
the ﬂoodgates were opened for non-constructive proofs. After Hilbert’s theorem, came numerous such proofs, including proofs from Cantor’s set theory. The
most well-known of them was the diagonal proof that there exist irrational and
transcendental numbers – the “father” of all the modern diagonalization proofs.
Indirect proofs of existence became fully accepted in the mainstream mathematics – because, strictly speaking, the existence of an object does not mean
that we must be able to actually construct it. The famous topologist L. E. J.
Brouwer agreed with this statement – that the existence in traditional mathematics does not imply constructibility – but he made a diﬀerent conclusion:
since we do need to construct objects, we must hence change the meaning of the
existential quantiﬁer in mathematics. He therefore proposed a new mathematics
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– what we now call constructive mathematics – in which the only way to prove
a statement ∃x P (x) is to produce a construction of an object x for which P (x)
is true; see, e.g., [7, 8]. Brouwer argued that this new understanding of the existential quantiﬁers is in better accordance with our intuition – at least with the
intuition of applied mathematicians who want, e.g., to solve equations, not just
“prove” that the solution exists. Because of this argument, he called his approach
to mathematics intuitionism – instead of blindly following formal constructions,
even when we start deviating of our intuitive meaning of the corresponding notions, we should also listen to our intuition when formal constructions lead us
astray.
To illustrate Brouwer’s point, it is actually not necessary to consider the
case when we have inﬁnitely many possible objects x. The same idea can be
illustrated on the example of a simple disjunction A ∨ B, when we have only
two alternatives A and B. For example, in classical mathematics, the Law of
Excluded Middle holds, according to which every statement is either true or
false A ∨ ¬A. However, a construction interpretation of a disjunction P ∨ Q
means that we know either P or Q. Since we do not know the truth value of a
generic statement A, in intuitionistic logic, the Law of Excluded Middle is not
generally true.
First years of constructive mathematics: constructive mathematics as a straightjacket. Several mathematicians whose interests were close to applications agreed
with (at least some of) Brouwer’s ideas, the most famous of them Hermann Weyl,
whose interest in application of mathematics to space-time has led him to interesting intuitionistic ideas [35].
However, such converts were rare. The main reason for this rarity is that to
avoid non-constructive existence proofs, Brouwer proposed to restrict allowed
logical constructions – so that proofs by contradiction become impossible. These
restrictions severely limited the ability of mathematicians to prove new results.
Not surprisingly, most mathematicians did not want to place themselves under
such severe restrictions. The general opinion was best expressed by David Hilbert
himself. By then, he has become the leading mathematician of that time. In 1900,
he was tasked, by the world mathematics community, to prepare the list of most
important problem that the 19 century mathematics should leave for the 20
century mathematicians to solve.
In regards to constructive mathematics, Hilbert famously said: “No one shall
drive us from the paradise that Cantor has created for us.”
Kolmogorov: it is the classical logic that is a straightjacket, not the constructive
one. For several years, constructive mathematics and the related constructive
logic were viewed as severely restricted version of the traditional ones. In logic,
this view changed drastically in 1925, when the famous Russian mathematician
A. N. Kolmogorov showed that classical logic can be interpreted as a subset of
the constructive one. To perform such a translation, we need to interpret each
classical statement A as a double negation ¬¬A. Correspondingly, e.g., a classical
disjunction A ∨ B must be interpreted as ¬¬(¬¬A ∨ ¬¬B), etc.
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Because of Kolmogorov’s result, the constructive logic was no longer perceived as a poor, limited version of the classical one: vice versa, the classical
logic is a particular case of the constructive one. Thus, the constructive logic
was shown to be richer and more versatile than the classical one: it allowed, e.g.,
in addition to the “classical” disjunction ¬¬(¬¬A ∨ ¬¬B), to also consider a
diﬀerent “constructive” disjunction A ∨ B.
Constructive logic became a widely used, widely studied, and well-respected
part of logic. But not yet constructive mathematics.
From the ubiquity of constructive logic to the ubiquity of constructive mathematics: Gelfond’s groundbreaking results. In the beginning, constructive mathematics was perceived as a kind of a limited version of the classical one – the tools
are limited and thus, was the argument, it is understandable that the results are
limited. Even constructive mathematicians themselves originally believed in this
tradeoﬀ: yes, our theorems are not as plentiful and not as sophisticated, but they
are deeper: every time we prove existence, we have a construction. Of course,
the need to provide constructions limits us – but makes our results more useful
in applications.
As more and more research was done in constructive mathematics, more
and more results became constructively proven – and these results became more
and more sophisticated. The real breakthrough came with the 1967 book of
E. Bishop, a classical mathematician who “saw the light” of constructive ideas
and transformed a large portion of basic math into constructive language [3].
With all these results, it became clearer that for every mathematical statement that does not explicitly contain a construction, classical truth implies constructive truth. Clearer, but still, every time, we needed to re-do the original
classical proof by meticulously avoiding constructively “non-kosher” ideas (like
the Law of Excluded Middle) that might have been used in the original classical
proof. This re-doing was taking a lot of time and eﬀort. A general, “meta”-result
of this type was badly needed to save all this time. And this general result was
proven by M. G. Gelfond in his groundbreaking papers [11–13].
Similarly to the way Kolmogorov interpreted a classical logical statement A
as ¬¬A and each logical connective A ⊙ B as ¬¬(¬¬A ⊙ ¬¬B), Gelfond interpreted classical real numbers (= classically converging sequences of integers) in
the constructive terms. Speciﬁcally, a classical sequence rn , which can be equivalently reformulated as a predicate P (n, r) for which for every n, there is exactly
one r satisfying this property (∀n∃!r P (r, n), where ! stands for uniqueness) was
constructivized into a logical property P (n, r) for which ∀n¬¬∃!r P (n, r) (a ﬁlling in the sense of [32]). This enabled Michael Gelfond to prove a met-result
about real numbers, continuous functions, etc.
Later, with V. Lifschitz, they extended this result to a large portion of set
theory – and thus working mathematics – by designing a constructive version
of set theory that allowed high-level constructions similar to the classical set
theories like ZF.
Because of their results, the constructive mathematics can no longer be perceived as a poor, limited version of the classical one: vice versa, the classical
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mathematics is a particular (weaker) case of the constructive one. The constructive mathematics was shown to be richer and more versatile than the classical
one: it allowed, e.g., in addition to the “classical” non-constructive existential
quantiﬁer, to also consider a diﬀerent “constructive” one.
Cantor’s paradise was regained – and an even better constructive one was
built on top of it.
How these exciting results inﬂuenced my own research. In the early 1970s, when
Michael Gelfond and Vladimir Lifschitz developed their excising results in St.
Petersburg, Russia, I was a student attending the logical seminars where their
presented diﬀerent stage of their research – and attending seminars led by them,
e.g., the seminar on set theory and its possible constructivization. I learned from
them (and they gave me an oﬃcial A for their seminar :-), I ran my ideas by
them, they helped me present my ideas and edit my papers.
My interest at that time was in using Gelfond’s theorem to prove new results
about constructive existence. I concentrated on three related directions.
First, since it is well known that it is not possible, in general, to compute the
exact solutions to a system of equation or the exact location of a maximizing
point, in practice – since measurements and implementations are approximate
anyway – we only need ε-approximate solutions, for an appropriate accuracy ε.
For many practical problems like solving systems of equations and ﬁnding locations of maxima, the algorithmic computability of such approximate solutions
was well known. I used Gelfond’s theorem to extend these results to more general
problems involving integration, minimization, and maximization.
My second direction was related to the fact that the proofs of most algorithmic non-computability results essentially use functions which have several
maxima and/or equations which have several solutions. It turned out that this
is not an accident: uniqueness actually implies algorithmic computability. Such
a result was ﬁrst proven by Lacombe [31] who designed an algorithm that inputs
a constructive function of one or several real variables on a bounded set that
attains its maximum on this set at exactly one point – and computes this global
maximum point. V. Lifschitz extended this result to constructive functions on
general constructive compact spaces [32].
In my paper [25] and in my dissertation [27], I showed how this result can
be applied to design many algorithms: from optimal approximation of functions
to designing a convex body from its metric to constructive a shortest path in
a curved space to designing a Riemannian space most tightly enclosing unit
spheres in a given Finsler space [9].
The third direction was to search for other classes of mathematical statements
for which classical validity automatically implies their constructive validity. I
found a few such classes (e.g., functions attaining maxima at two points, with
a known lower bound on the distance between them), but mostly, the results
turned out to be negative. For example, Lacombe-Lifschitz-style algorithm is
not possible for functions that have exactly two global maxima, not possible for
functions on non-compact sets, etc. [25–29].
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In the Appendix, we provide an informal explanation of what is so special
about uniqueness, and how classes like this can be constructed.
Constructive mathematics after Gelfond: very brieﬂy. Since the 1970s, many
interesting results were constructively proved within constructive mathematics;
see, e.g., [1, 2, 4–6, 29, 30, 34]. It is impossible to enumerate all such results in
this short paper. Let us just mention that the uniqueness-implies-computability
results were eﬀectively used by Kohlenbach and his school to come up with new
eﬃcient algorithms; see, e.g., [21–23].
Gelfond’s research after constructive mathematics. While I was working on
Michael Gelfond’s constructive ideas, Michael himself moved further, in the direction that very naturally follows from his constructive research. Indeed, as we
have mentioned earlier, constructive mathematics started with an observation
that the meaning of disjunction A ∨ B (“A or B”) in mathematics is sometimes
diﬀerent from the intuitive meaning of “or”. A thorough analysis of this distinction led to the realization that to adequately represent our intuition about
“or”, we need (at least) two diﬀerent disjunction operations: the constructive
disjunction and the classical disjunction.
This distinction – and constructive mathematics in general – got a great
boost in the 1950s and 1960s, when computers became ubiquitous and construction became not just a theoretical concept but rather an everyday task. This
boost led to the urgent need for translating the existing knowledge into algorithmic computer-understandable terms. The experience of such translation showed
that “or” is not the only logical connective whose intuitive and mathematical
meanings sometime diﬀer; the same turned out to be for other connectives as
well.
This realization started with the implication A → B (“A implies B”). In
classical mathematics, A → B simply means that either B is true or A is false.
As a result, in mathematics, statements like “if 2 + 2 = 5 then witches can
ﬂy” make perfect sense. From the intuitive viewpoint, however, “A implies B”
means that the statement A was actually used in proving the statement B –
i.e., crudely speaking, that the statement B would be not true without A. This
intuitive meaning of implication was partly captured by if-then rules of logic
programming.
For logic programs without negation, the intuitive meaning of commonsense
implication has been captured by the notion of a minimal model, i.e., a model in
which the smallest possible set of atoms is true. This means, in particular, that
if A is true, then either it was assumed to be true from the very beginning, or
it follows from a rule of the type A ← B, C, . . . in which all the conditions B,
C, etc. are already proven to be true. However, until the late 1980s, there was
no similar intuitively clear semantics of logic program with negation. Such a semantics – called stable semantics – was provided by M. Gelfond and V. Lifschitz
in their 1988 paper [14]. This semantics – in essence, formalizing the above intuitive meaning of implication – indeed proved to be very adequate in capturing
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the intuitive meaning of if-then rules, and thus, in transforming abstract commonsense and expert knowledge into a set of constructive rules – rules enabling
us to algorithmically solve problems.
After the success with implication, came another realization: that the mathematical and intuitive meanings of negation are also slightly diﬀerent, and that
in order to capture this intuitive meaning, we need two diﬀerent negations: classical negation (meaning that A is known to be false) and “negation as failure”
(meaning that we cannot prove A) [15].
This was just the beginning. Then came the use of disjunctions in logic
programming, the use of sets, and – slowly but surely – we seem to be arriving
at a situation where classical mathematics will become a particular case of this
generalized “logic programming” – like it became, in eﬀect, a particular case of
constructive mathematics.
And when we reach this stage – sometime in the next century – then no one
shall drive us from the paradise that Brouwer, Kolmogorov, Gelfond, Lifschitz,
and others have created for us!
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Appendix: Explanation of why uniqueness naturally appears and how other possible classes of statements can be thus generated. Let us explain why uniqueness
naturally appears in our attempts to describe classes of properties P (x) for which
the classical validity of the existence statement ∃x P (x) implies its constructive
validity.
To ﬁnd such classes, let us try to describe all possible reasonable classes
of properties P (x). It is, in general, algorithmically impossible to construct an
object x that satisﬁes the given property P (x); thus, instead, we may look for
an object that satisﬁes the given only property only “approximately” (in some
reasonable sense). To formally describe the notion of an approximation, we also
need relations like d(x, y) ≤ ε, meaning that the two points x and y are ε-close.
To describe a general class, we can combine the atomic properties P (x) and
d(x, y) ≤ ε by using propositional connectives and quantiﬁers.
We need at least two diﬀerent variables x and y to meaningfully use the
formula d(x, y) ≤ ε. For simplicity, let us restrict ourselves to the case when
there are no quantiﬁers (other than implicitly assumed universal quantiﬁers in
front of the formula) and that we have exactly two diﬀerent variables in a formula
describing the class.
We are looking for classes of classical (non-constructive) formulas, so the
propositional connectives should also be understood in terms of the classical
logic. In the classical logic, every propositional statement can be described in
a CNF form, as a conjunction C1 & C2 & . . . of clauses Ci , and every clause Ci
is a disjunction of literals (i.e., atomic statements or their negations). Thus,
every possible class of properties described by such formulas is an intersection
of classes corresponding to clauses. So, to study general classes, it is suﬃcient
to study classes described by individual clauses.
In the classical logic, every clause a∨b∨. . .∨c can be equivalently described as
a rule ¬a & ¬b & . . . → c. So, instead of studying clauses, we will study possible
rules.
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Rules must relate to the original property, thus, one of the literals in the
clause must be P (x) or ¬P (x). Since we must have an approximation – otherwise,
no general algorithm is possible – at least one other literal must come from the
atomic statement d(x, y) ≤ ε. For this literal to be meaningful, we must have
at least one literal with the variable x and at least one with the variable y.
These clauses can only contain literals coming from the atoms P (x), P (y), and
d(x, y) ≤ ε. Let us classify the corresponding rules.
One of these rules to uniqueness: the rule P (x) & P (y) → d(x, y) ≤ ε. Indeed,
this rule means that all the solution to our problem are ε-close to each other –
i.e., that, in eﬀect, with the accuracy ε, we have a unique solution. Let us show
that other possible rules do not lead to meaningful classes.
If one of the literals corresponding to P (x) is positive, we can make it a
conclusion of the corresponding if-then rule. Depending on whether each of the
remaining two literals is positive or negative, we have four possibilities:
– The ﬁrst possibility is P (x) & d(x, y) ≤ ε → P (y); in this case, once P (x)
holds for some object x, it holds for all ε-close values y. In the usual case
when the set of objects is a connected set (e.g., the set of real numbers, Rn ,
the class of all continuous or diﬀerentiable functions), in which we can get
from each point x to every other point y by a sequence of ε-neighbors, this
means that if P (x) holds for one object x, it holds for every x as well. Thus,
this case covers only two trivial properties P (x): the property that is always
true and the property that is always false.
– The second possibility is the rule ¬P (x) & d(x, y) ≤ ε → P (y). In this case,
for y = x, we conclude that ¬P (x) → P (x) thus, that ¬P (x) is impossible,
and P (x) holds for all x – also a trivial case.
– The third possibility is P (x) & d(x, y) > ε → P (y). Similarly to the ﬁrst
possibility, we can also usually connect every two elements by a sequence in
which every next one is ε-far from the previous one, so we also only get two
trivial cases.
– The fourth possibility is ¬P (x) & d(x, y) > ε → P (y), i.e., equivalently,
¬P (x) & ¬P (y) → d(x, y) ≤ ε. In this case, all the objects that do not
satisfy the property P (x) are ε-close. So, with the exception of this small
vicinity, every object satisﬁes the property P (x). In this sense, this case is
“almost” trivial.
Finally, let us consider the clauses in which literals corresponding to both atoms
P (x) and P (y) are negative. In this case, we have two possibilities:
– the possibility P (x) & P (y) → d(x, y) ≤ ε that we already considered, and
– the possibility P (x) & P (y) → d(x, y) > ε; in this case, taking x = y, we
conclude that P (x) is impossible, so the property P (x) is always false.
For the case of two variables x and y, the (informal) statement is proven.
For a larger number of variables, we can have clauses of the type
P (x) & P (y) & P (z) → (d(x, y) ≤ ε ∨ d(y, z) ≤ ε ∨ d(x, z) ≤ ε)
corresponding to the assumption that there are exactly two objects satisfying
the property P (x), etc.

